Virtualization
M
odern Web applications are complex networks of code running on multiple servers and in clientside Web browsers. JavaScript is a dynamically typed, object-based scripting language in which the code is compiled to bytecode instructions at runtime (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ JavaScript). It lets developers add interactivity at the client side of a Web application. However, JavaScript is an interpreted language, which is slower than compiled languages, and it can't take advantage of parallel multicore processors because it's sequential. Our aim with the work we present here is to speed up client-side execution.
Researchers have suggested several JavaScript optimization techniques and benchmarks, but they're unrepresentative for JavaScript execution in Web applications. [1] [2] [3] For instance, the popular just-in-time (JIT) compilation technique -in which the JavaScript code is first compiled then executed as native code -decreases execution time for JavaScript benchmarks but often increases execution time in popular Web applications. 4 As a sequential programming language, JavaScript can't exploit the performance potential that parallel multicore processors offer. Many Web applications have the potential for significant parallelism, with speedups of up to 45 times compared to sequential execution.
Web Workers enables parallel execution of tasks in Web applications, 6 but programmers must extract and express this parallelism.
To hide the underlying hardware's details, we could dynamically extract parallelism from a sequential program using thread-level speculation (TLS). The sidebars "Thread-Level Speculation Principles" and "Software-Based Thread-Level Speculation" provide more details about this approach. Researchers have demonstrated TLS's performance potential for applications with static loops or statically typed languages, and in Java bytecode environments. Recent attempts have used TLS with JavaScript -for example, in the Rhino JavaScript engine. 7 Here, we present an implementation of TLS in the Squirrelfish JavaScript engine used in the WebKit browser environment (www.webkit. org). Our approach relies on method-level speculation, including return value prediction. A Web application's execution and behavior depend not only on the JavaScript engine but also on the interaction between JavaScript and the Web browser, such as manipulation of the Document Object Model (DOM) tree. However, here we deliberately focus on the JavaScript aspect.
Web applications provide many opportunities for speculative execution. First, their event-driven nature leads to many independent function calls. Second, JavaScript programming supports anonymous functions -that is, dynamically generated unnamed functions. Finally, like other scripting-based languages, JavaScript supports dynamic execution through primitives such as eval, where a text string is evaluated at runtime as code. The large number of function calls resulting from these situations provide considerable TLS opportunities. However, the potential memory overheads for managing and tracking these function calls can be significant. JIT-based approaches can suffer excessive memory and runtime penalties for Web application execution for similar reasons. Using event-generated dynamic functions can
Thread-Level Speculation Principles
T hread-level speculation (TLS) aims to dynamically extract parallelism from a sequential program, either in hardware [1] [2] [3] or software (see the "Software-Based Thread-Level Speculation" sidebar). Two main approaches exist: loop-level parallelism and method-level speculation.
In loop-level parallelism, each loop iteration is assigned to a thread. We can then (ideally) execute as many iterations in parallel as we have processors. however, this approach has limitations: data dependencies can limit the number of iterations that can execute in parallel, and the memory requirements and runtime overhead for detecting data dependencies can be considerable.
In method-level speculation, we try to execute each function call as a thread. With this approach, we must correctly predict the return values when we speculate as well as the writes and reads that cause the speculative program to violate sequential semantics. The last two are typically detected when the values associated with two function calls are committed back to their parent thread.
Between two speculative threads we can have three types of data dependencies: read-after-write (RaW), write-afterread (WaR), and write-after-write (WaW). a TLS implementation must be able to detect these dependencies during runtime using information about read and write addresses from each loop iteration. a key design parameter for a TLS system is the granularity at which it can detect data dependency violations.
When a TLS system detects a data dependency violation, it must abort the execution and roll it back to a safe point. Thus, all TLS systems need a rollback mechanism. To do rollbacks, the system must store the original data values before each speculation point. Consequently, the bookkeeping related to this functionality results in both memory and runtime overhead. For TLS systems to be efficient, the number of rollbacks should be low. a key design parameter for a TLS system is the data structures used to track and detect data dependence violations. The more precise the data dependency tracking, the more memory overhead is required. Unfortunately, one effect of imprecise dependence detection is the risk of a false-positive violation -that is, when a dependence violation is detected when no actual (true) violation is present. Consequently, we must do unnecessary rollbacks, which decreases performance. TLS implementations can differ depending on whether they update data speculatively "in-place" -that is, move the old value to a buffer and write the new value directly -or in a special speculation buffer. www.computer.org/internet/ IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING induce many invocations of the JIT compiler and result in many JITed code fragments that must be stored, managed, and eventually evicted when they aren't re-executed enough times to justify the overheads. So in general, while JIT and TLS aren't complementary approaches, our TLS approach decreases the execution time of JavaScript in Web applications.
Software-Based Thread-Level Speculation S everal software-based thread-level speculation (TLS) proposals exist, and we review some of the most important ones here.
Derek Bruening and his colleagues proposed a softwarebased TLS system that targets loops in which the memory references are stride-predictable. 1 Furthermore, it's one of the first techniques that's applicable to while-loops, where the loop exit condition is unknown until the last iteration. The authors evaluate their technique on both dense and sparse matrix applications, as well as on linked-list traversals.
Peter Rundberg and Per Stenström proposed a TLS implementation that resembles the behavior of a hardware-based TLS system. 2 Their approach tracks data dependencies precisely, thereby minimizing the number of unnecessary rollbacks caused by false-positive violations. The downside is the high memory overhead.
Iffat Kazi and David Lilja developed a course-grained thread pipelining model that exploits coarse-grained parallelism. 3 They suggest pipelining the concurrent execution of loop iterations speculatively, using runtime dependence checking.
anasua Bhowmik and Manoj Franklin developed a compiler framework for extracting parallel threads from a sequential program for execution on a TLS system. 4 They support both speculative and nonspeculative threads, and out-of-order thread spawning. Furthermore, their work addresses both loop and nonloop parallelism.
Michael Chen and Kunle Olukotun propose using speculatively execute method calls in parallel with code after the method call. 5 They implement their techniques in the Java Runtime Parallelizing Machine (JRPM).
Christopher Picket and Clark Verbrugge developed SableSpMT, a framework for method-level speculation and return value prediction in Java programs. 6 They implemented their solution in SableVM, a Java Virtual Machine, and thus it works at the bytecode level.
Cosmin Oancea and his colleagues present a novel software-based TLS proposal that supports in-place updates. 7 Their proposal has a low memory overhead with a constant instruction overhead, at the price of slightly lower precision in the dependence violation detection mechanism. however, it avoids serial commits of speculative values, which in many other proposals limit scalability. James Mickens and his colleagues introduce Crom, 8 a JavaScript speculation engine. Crom rewrites event handles to speculative ones and executes them in a cloned browser context. It's implemented in a JavaScript library and runs on unmodified JavaScript engines. Speculative event handlers are mainly executed when the main execution thread is idle.
Mojtaba Mehrara and his colleagues have addressed how to use multicore systems in JavaScript engines 9 and developed a lightweight speculation mechanism for dynamic parallelization of JavaScript applications. 10 however, their studies have a different approach and a different target than ours. They target mainly loop parallelization and trace-based just-in-timecompiled JavaScript code, where the most common execution flow is compiled into an execution trace. Then, runtime checks (guards) are inserted to check whether control flow is still valid for the trace. The authors execute the guards in parallel with the main execute flow (trace).
JavaScript and Web Applications
JavaScript execution is first compiled to bytecode instructions, which are then executed in a JavaScript engine. JavaScript has a syntax similar to C and Java, while offering functionalities found in dynamic programming languages, such as anonymous and evaluate functions.
JavaScript engines such as Google's V8 engine (http://code.google.com/ p/v8/), WebKit's Squirrelfish, and Mozilla's SpiderMonkey and TraceMonkey (https://developer.mozilla.org/en/ SpiderMonkey/) have high single-threaded performance for a set of benchmarks. However, such performance results can be misleading for Web applications, [1] [2] [3] and optimizing for these benchmarks' characteristics could increase such applications' execution time. 4 Many Web applications are webpages with interactive functionality executed in a JavaScript engine. Web application functionality is typically defined as events, which in JavaScript are functions that execute when certain things occur in the Web application -for example, mouse clicks when a webpage loads for the first time, or tasks that execute between time intervals. Moreover, a Web application might manipulate parts of itself that aren't directly accessible from a JavaScript engine alone. Such functionality executes in the JavaScript engine, but the program flow is part of the Web application.
Previous studies have shown that JavaScript's execution behavior in Web applications differs substantially from that of most JavaScript benchmarks. Web applications use dynamic programming language features extensively, [1] [2] [3] where various elements are defined at runtime (through eval functions), and object types and extensions are redefined during runtime (for instance, through anonymous functions). This has two major consequences on program behavior. First, JIT compilation often fails to decrease execution time because the Web applications lack large loop-like structures, and a significant overhead occurs when compiling small JavaScript code sequences to native code. Second, interactive structures are often defined in the Web application as events that are executed as functions. In such cases, the resulting large number of function calls is a suitable workload for TLS.
TLS Implementation for JavaScript
We have implemented TLS for the Squirrelfish JavaScript engine, which lets us speculatively execute JavaScript functions in parallel, and thus improve Web application performance.
Speculation Mechanism
Squirrelfish executes JavaScript by first compiling the JavaScript code to bytecode instructions, and then executing the by tecode instructions in the JavaScript engine. This lets us extract both the compiled bytecode instructions that should be executed, and the trace of those instructions' sequential execution. We use the sequential execution trace to validate the correctness of the speculative execution in our experiments offline. This trace contains the order in which Squirrelfish executed the bytecode instructions and the values associated with computing those instructions. We modified the Squirrelfish interpreter so an instance of it executes as a thread.
Our implementation sends the compiled bytecode instructions from the Web application to our modified Squirrelfish interpreter. We initialize a counter realtime to 0. For each bytecode instruction, the value of realtime increases by 1. We give the interpreter a unique ID (p_realtime) that will initially be p_0.
During execution, we might encounter a bytecode instruction that indicates the start of a function call. We extract the realtime value and the ID of the thread that makes this callfor example, p_0220 (a f unction is ca lled after 220 bytecode instructions from p_0). We denote the value of this function call's position as function_order, which emulates the sequential time in a TLS program (see Figure 1) . We deter m i ne whet her t h i s f u nc t ion ha s been speculated previously by looking up the previous [ function_order] . Previous is a vector in which each entry is organized by the function_ order of the respective function that tells us whether the function has been speculated on before. If the value is 1, the function has previously been speculated unsuccessfully; if the value is 0, it has been successfully speculated or not speculated at all. We denote the function call's position as a fork point.
If the function call's position is a fork point, we set its previous[ function_order] to 1 to ensure that, in case of a rollback, we won't set this as a fork point in the future. We copy the state of the JavaScript engine right before the fork point, which we'll use in the event of a rollback. This state contains the list of previously modified global values, the list of states from each thread, the registers' content, and the content of previous.
Then, we create a new (or reuse an old) thread that contains a new Squirrelfish engine, create a unique ID for this thread, and copy the realtime value from the thread's parent. We modify the parent's state such that the current instruction changes from the position of the "function call" bytecode instruction to the position of the associated "end of function call" bytecode instruction. In other words, the parent thread skips the function call and continues to execute speculatively after the function call.
We now have two interpreters running as concurrent threads. We repeat this process for each function encountered that could be a suitable candidate for speculation, thereby allowing nested speculation. If we encounter a conflict between two global variables, get an incorrect return value prediction, or write to the DOM tree, we perform a rollback to the point where the speculation started. Figure 2 outlines the speculation process and a subsequent rollback to restore the execution to a safe state -that is, the last function, commit, or where the speculation started.
Data Dependence Violation Detection
To achieve a correct speculative execution, we check for write and read conflicts between global variables, object property ID names, and function calls' unsuccessful return value predictions. Each global variable has a unique identification, uid, which is either the global variable's index or the name of the ID in the object property. When we encounter a read or write bytecode instruction, we check the global list variable_modification. This list contains previous reads and writes for all uids sorted by uid. If the uid is not in the list, we lock variable_ modif ication, inser t the uid in variable_ modification, create a sublist for reads and writes to that uid, and insert the type of bytecode instruction, realtime, and function_order as the first element of the sublist. If no conflicts occurred between the current executed bytecode and the uid's previous reads and writes, we insert an element to the head of the sublist for this uid with the type of bytecode, realtime, and function_order. Each time we encounter a read or write access to a uid, we evaluate the following cases in variable_modification:
1. The current operation is a read, and a previous read exists to the same uid. In this case, the order in which the uid is read doesn't matter. 2. The current operation is a read, and a previous write exists to the same uid. In this case, we must check the realtime and the function_order for the current read and the previous write. If a read occurred such that current function_order > previous function_ order and current realtime < previous realtime, then the program's execution order is no longer correct, and we must do a rollback. 3. The current operation is a write, and a previous read exists to the same uid. In this case, we check the realtime and the function_order for the current write and the previous read. If current function_order > previous function_ order and current realtime < previous realtime, then the program's execution order is no longer correct, and we must do a rollback. 4. The current operation is a write, and a previous write exists to the same uid. We must do a rollback if the current write happens before the previous write in realtime, and they have the other order in function_order, or if the write happens after the previous write in realtime but before the previous write in function_order.
Rollback
Cases 2, 3, and 4 force us to do a rollback to ensure program correctness globally. We also do rollbacks if we write to the DOM tree. After a rollback, the program re-executes from a point before we speculated the function. At this point, we extract information for relevant threads -for example, previous, the number of associated threads, the values of the associated registers, the values of the global variables and ID (restored for the associated threads), the previous value (with the index of this failed speculation set to 1), and the variable conflicts in variable_modification.
Even though we have a set of threads that should be active, after the rollback some threads might not be associated with the TLS system's current state. So, we need to recursively go through the threads and their child threads that are now part of the active state. The resulting list contains the threads that are necessary in the execution's current state. We stop the remainder of the threads and their associated interpreter and set them to an idle state for later reuse.
Commit
When a speculative thread reaches the end of its execution, we must commit its modifications of global variables and object property IDs back to its parent thread. The commit can't be completed before child threads from this thread have returned and committed their values back to their parent thread. These child threads' updates to global variables and object property IDs are to be committed to the current thread. If the associated JavaScript function has a return value that we fail to predict correctly, or if executing the function causes violations to the sequential semantics, we must roll back.
Experimental Methodology and Results
To evaluate TLS for enhancing JavaScript execution¸ we selected 15 Web applications from the Alexa list of most visited Web applications (www.alexa.com/topsites). This let us cover different Web application types and ensure that they were being used by a reasonably large group. Table 1 lists the selected applications. We defined and recorded a set of use cases for the selected Web applications intended to exhibit example usage and executed them in WebKit. To enhance reproducibility, we use the AutoIt scripting environment 8 to automatically execute the various use cases in a controlled fashion. We describe our experimental methodology elsewhere. 3 We conducted all experiments on a system running Ubuntu 10.04 and equipped with dual quad-core processors (that is, eight cores in total) and 16 Gbytes of main memory. We measured the time of the JavaScript execution performed in the JavaScript engine. We executed each use case 10 times and took the median of the results for comparison.
To validate our TLS implementation's correctness, we compared the executed bytecode instructions with the committed bytecode instructions in our TLS implementation, and compared the return values and the written values against the sequential execution trace.
Speedup with TLS and JIT
We compare the JavaScript execution times of our selected Web applications using TLS, the Google V8 JIT engine, or the JIT-enabled Squirrelfish engine to the sequential execution time on the unmodified interpreted Squirrelfish engine, as in Equation (1) Figure 3 shows that
• TLS always improves the performance;
• the Squirrelfish JIT-based engine degrades the performance for 10 out of 15 cases (similar to results in other work 9 ); and • the Google V8 JIT engine degrades the performance for eight out of 15 cases.
When TLS is enabled, YouTube executes up to 8.4 times faster than with the sequential execution on a dual quad-core computer. We verified that the superlinear speedup is due to cache effects. This makes sense when we look at the large number of threads and low number of rollbacks required (see Table 2 ). We see that numerous speculations and relatively few rollbacks are typical for all 15 Web applications. However, the improved execution time varies. Table 2 lists a set of numbers related to Web application execution behavior when we use TLS.
General Execution Behavior
The results show that we were able to speculate on a very large number of JavaScript functions for all the Web applications except Wikipedia, and, in most cases, we speculated more than 1,000 times. This indicates a high potential parallelism in Web applications, which is in line with previous research. 5 We also observe that the number of rollbacks during execution is small compared to the number of speculations. In general, we speculate numerous times for each rollback -between 16 and 92 times for 13 out of 15 Web applications.
We measured the largest number of functions that execute concurrently during application execution -that is, the maximum number of threads. We observe that, in general, we were able to execute a large number of threads concurrently: seven of the Web applications executed more than 50 threads concurrently. We also measured the deepest nesting speculation during execution -that is, the maximum speculation depth. Our results show no obvious relationship between the maximum speculation depth and the maximum number of threads.
The average depth shows the depth of the recursive search when we finish executing a speculated function (either after a rollback or when we commit the result of the function's execution). To find the information to evict, we must recursively search the speculation tree, and we measured the average depth for these searches. We didn't observe any relationship between the maximum speculation depth and the average depth we need to search to remove information.
Finally, we measured the average memory usage for storing information during speculation at each rollback. In general, the memory requirements for storing data associated with the speculation are relatively small, but we observed high peaks of memory usage (up to 300 Mbytes).
Our results indicate that even though a risk exists for write and read conflicts, these rarely happened for the use cases. We can see this from the large number of speculations and small number of rollbacks -that is, the relative number of speculations over rollbacks is high. Another indication is the large number of threads that we executed concurrently. Due to the numerous speculations and few rollbacks, we could execute a relatively large number of functions concurrently (maximum number of threads).
From the maximum speculation depth, we see that a large speculation depth, doesn't necessarily mean a large number of threads. Moreover, no relationship exists between a large search depth and the amount of data we clear out after a rollback or a commit. We also see that the average memory usage varies between the cases, and no clear relationship exists between average memory usage and a large speculation depth.
O
ur TLS implementation improves performance for all studied Web applications. In contrast, we found that JIT compilation decreases performance for 10 out of 15 applications. Our results show that for the selected Web applications, TLS significantly reduces execution time. We achieved speedups of up to 8.4 times compared to a sequential execution, and without modifying any of the JavaScript source code (thus hiding the details of exploiting multicore processors from the JavaScript programmer).
We also evaluated how nested speculation works. The maximum speculation depth ranges from 4 (Wikipedia) to 99 (Wordpress), while the average depth when we search for data made irrelevant after a rollback or a commit goes up to 9.16 (Facebook). Our results indicate that we can find a large number of function calls, which will be a suitable work load for T LS. Furthermore, nested speculation is important for finding a sufficient number of suitable functions for speculation, and thus to achieving a high degree of dynamic parallelism. Because speculation requires that we store the state of the JavaScript engine at the speculation point, the memor y overhead can sometimes be large.
